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Another View of the Judiciary Committee's Plan
A Reply to Judge Clements
By PETER H. HOLME, JR.,
of the Denver Bar
Author's note: Since the foregoing article went to press, I
have received the word of Judge Clement's death. From my
acquaintance with Judge Clements, I feel sure he would be willing and anxious that the article written in answer to his last
publication should be published as written and without apology.
Judge Clements was a sincere and forceful debater, and gave his
opponents full opportunity to be heard. I am sorry that the said
circumstances of his death must make mine the last word in this
debate.
In the December number of DICTA appeared an article by Judge Clements, Judge of the County Court of Delta County, criticizing the plan of the
Judiciary Committee of the Colorado Bar Association for improvements in
the Colorado judicial system. Judge Clements wrote with such taste and
restraint that the generalities of his criticisms may have been submerged in
the reader's mind by the charm of his writing. Therefore, I feel called upon
to make a few rejoinders.
The judge's article was in two parts: The first, expressing his objections
to the committee's plan for non-partisan selection of judges through the use
of nominating commissions and appointment by the governor and also of the
committee's proposed compulsory retirement of judges who have attained
age 75; the second part expressing Judge Clements' ideas of what new laws
are needed in connection with the judiciary.
In his criticism of the committee's plan, the judge makes two main points:
First, that the use of nominating commissions to select candidates from whom
the governor must appoint a judge to fill a vacancy is undemocratic and
radical, because it takes away .from the people the power to select their judges;
second, that the provision of compulsory retirement at age 75 is arbitrary
and unsound, because many judges at that age are at the peak of their abilities.
In the first point the judge begins with a false premise. He suggests that
the people select our judges under the present system. This is clearly not
the fact, and later, Judge Clements admits it, "It is a matter of common
knowledge that lawyers dominate our judicial conventions . . ." If the
judge by judicial conventions refers to conventions concerning our laws and
judicial system perhaps he may be right. Who else should dominate the
consideration of amending our laws or judicial system? If, however, he refers
to party caucuses and nominating conventions then I submit he is wrong.
The lawyers do not dominate such conventions or if it should happen that
such lawyers as participate in them have the greatest influence such lawyers
are not ordinarily representative of the entire bar. Unfortunately perhaps
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most lawyers are too busy with practice to be concerned with politics.
To get to the point, candidates for judicial positions are selected by the
party leaders, including the perennial office holders, tavern owners and those
who dig into their own pockets to finance the campaigns. Under the best of
circumstances judicial candidates are agreed upon by party leaders from
both parties in order to obtain the best candidates available without reference
to party affiliations or rather in an effort to have each party represented. In
the past in some judicial districts this system has worked very well but there
is now clear evidence in some of the judicial districts along the Eastern slope,
including Denver that selection of judges on a party basis is becoming stronger
as public opinion on national politics becomes more tense. We cannot go on
forever depending on Providence and the interest of party leaders in the
public good to maintain a sound judiciary or improve it.
The judge says that the Missouri system is "still in the experimental
stage." Actually, it has been in operation for seven years, has been chosen
three times by the voters of Missouri, each time with a larger margin of
voters favoring it, is being seriously considered in many states as the best and
most intelligent method of selecting judicial material. The basic idea of this
plan, however, was worked out thirty or forty years ago by the American
Bar Association and the American Judicature Society and was officially
endorsed by the American Bar Association in 1937. Its origins go back as
far as Jeremy Bentham, more than one hundred years ago, who said, "though
it is better that judges should not be selected by popular election, the people
of their district ought to have the power, after sufficieni experience, of removing them from trust." Must we wait another hundred years before we try it?
In the files of the Judiciary Committee are copies of letters from a score
of leading lawyers in Missouri, all but two of whom have stated that the
system with such faults as it has is worth maintaining and if the issue were
presented anew they would vote for it again. An able exposition of the
plan appears in the American Bar Association Journal for December, 1947,
on page 1, by James M. Douglas, Chief Justice of the Missouri Supreme
Court.
Under our present system, I maintain, the voters do not select the judges.
They merely choose between two or more placed before them by the party
leaders. Furthermore, two of the members of our present Supreme Court
and fourteen of our twenty-eight district judges were appointed to office by
the governor to fill vacancies. In most instances in the history of our state the
governor's choice has been good but in some cases very poor judges have
been so appointed in Colorado. The judges thus appointed for vacancies were
not selected by the people and when they ran for reelection if their records
were good the tendency of the voters was to perpetuate them in office, unless
there was a political landslide. In that event able judges of the other party
fell with their ticket.
What alternative does the Judiciary Committee plan offer, in place of
our present system? I submit that it offers a more intelligent method of
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selection; not by an anonymous group of men with axes to grind but by a
group selected for integrity and interest in maintaining an able judiciary-a
group known to all interested enough to read the papers. This group in addition to the laymen appointed by the governor to this responsible position
includes lawyers selected by all the bar. This group, unlike the unnamed
powers behind the political thrones, must bear public responsibility for its
choices. There is no scapegoat to be blamed if the choice is wrong. The group
is balanced as evenly as possible among the political parties; it has no advantage to obtain except such credit as it may receive for a public service well
done. The experience in Missouri over seven years has been that none of
the nominating commissions has in any instance failed to nominate an able man.
Is this method not a more logical way to choose a judge? A judge should
be a man qualified as an expert in a highly complex and technical field. You
do not choose your doctor nor your school teacher by popular vote nor leave
the selection of them to the county Republican or Democratic committee.
Imagine selecting a state sanitary engineer because he is the winner of a
popularity contest. Personally I should rather leave the choice of an expert
to the men familiar with his qualifications than to have to flip a coin to
decide whether to vote for one unknown candidate or another.
Judge Clements says that a judge under the proposed plan would be
"beholden to a small group of men." We now entrust the business of filling
vacancies on the bench to :the governor without any -restrictions upon his
selection. The plan contemplates that the- initial selection be made by men
presumably disinterested in politics and interested in the ability of candidates
and that the governor then be required to appoint from among the three
nominees so selected. A judge selected under the plan would no more be
beholden to the governor than to the commission and in neither case as beholden as a present judge is to the leaders of his political party who succeed
in placing him upon the primary ballot.
Furthermore, even if friendship should play a part in a judge's selection,
under the plan it would have nothing to do with his keeping his job after
he got it. The question of his staying in office -would be left to the people.
It is common knowledge that past favors are not comparable in -influence to
expected future favors. A judge selected under the plan would be beholden
to no one in the future.
Judge Clements suggests that the plan would "perpetuate a judge in
office." This is true only so long as the judge's work is good and if it is why
should he not be perpetuated in office? I submit that a judge more than any
other public official should be perpetuated in office until he reaches an age
when in tie interest of the public and himself he should be retired. There is
nothing novel in the observation that many lawyers of the highest caliber and
ability refuse to accept a judicial career simply because they dare not take
the financial risk, or do not care to become involved in the unpleasant and
sometimes degrading experience of political campaigning. Under the present
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system a lawyer with ability must surrender a lucrative practice to go upon
the bench and assume the risk that later he will be thrown back upon his own
resources without clients, not for any fault of his, but because the political
winds have changed. It is not easy to build a new practice after years of
absence and at a greater age.
Therefore, I maintain judges should be perpetuated in office to the extent
that they are assured if their jobs are well done they will not be tossed out
in a national political swing. We must avoid the situation described by a
former justice of the Missouri Supreme Court, "I was elected in 1916 because
Woodrow Wilson kept us out of war-I was defeated in 1920 because
Woodrow Wilson hadn't kept us out of war. I do not believe five per cent
of the voters of Missouri ever knew I was on either ticket."
One more point-I submit that judges, unlike policy-making public
officials, should not be too responsive to the popular demand of the moment.
The fact that a law is unpopular does not necessarily make it unwise or
unconstitutional. Therefore, the judge who must administer the law regardless of public opinion, to my mind, should not be subservient to public opinioil.
A word about Judge Clements' second point in criticism of the plan;
that is compulsory retirement of judges at age 75. Of course, there are the
Holmeses, the Brandeises, and the Hugheses-but they are the exceptions.
There are instances within the experience of all of us of Colorado judges who
have continued to serve on the bench after senility has overcome their ability
to give the proper public service. With the average man intelligence, vitality
or interest may decline before the age of 75 has been reached. Those judges
over 75 retired under the plan who are still competent to serve may be called
upon by the chief justice as the need arises to fill positions temporarily vacated
by the illness or death of another judge. Retirement for age could be left, it
is true, to the exercise of some board's discretion but the danger with such a
plan is that the board would probably not exercise its discretion except in the
most flagrant cases. The committee's plan also proposes to give the judicial
council power to remove judges who have been mentally or physically disabled from further service. At present there is no such remedy in our law.
At the close pf his article, Judge Clements mentions those reforms which
he regards as desirable. Six of the seven changes which he advocates are in
the plan, and his seventh one requires judges to run as non-partisans instead
of against their record! Of the other features of the plan Judge Clements
states that they are "Impractical, radical and unsatisfactory." All of the
features of the plan were arrived at by scores of men after more than a year
of work, after exploring every field for evidence and information, including
all constructive criticisms from the Colorado bar. It seems hardl justifiable
that so much work, effort and open-mindedness should be tossed aside by such
general words, "impractical, radical and unsatisfactory." Whether they are
impractical or not will only be determined by practice; if radical means a
departure from the past then indeed they are radical. At the annual conven-
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tion they proved satisfactory to three lawyers out of every four.
What do the remaining features of the plan contemplate? First, an
integrated court with the chief justice selected for his ability as an administrator to act as a true president of the court. Second, the assurance that so far
as possible judges shall be qualified lawyers who know the rules of their business, shall stick to their jobs and keep out of politics and that the chief justice
may keep those judges not busy at work. Third, that a judicial council shall
'be created to study constantly improvements in the laws and procedure and
the business of the courts. Fourth, to avoid a present ridiculous procedure
of double trials in contested matters in the county court. Fifth, to get rid of
the worst stigma of our judicial system, the justice of the peace courts, and
place their jurisdiction with able and trained men, namely the county judges,
and under magistrates selected by them and under referees appointed by them.
These represent changes and to some all changes are radical. The real
question is, is our present system cumbersome and unsatisfactory? Ask the
average layman and he will tell you.

"Equal Justice Under Law"
By WAYNE C. WILLIAMS

Of the Denver bar; former Attorney General of Colorado;
former Special Assistant Attorney General of the United
States.

The truest and best forum for the lawyer is an appellate court in which
he can make an oral argument for the rights and interests of his client.
Here is the natural forum for a lawyer and here his forensic talents
should show in their highest form.
The court ought to be as anxious to hear a lawyer argue his case orally
as the lawyer is to present it.
I have always felt that there was the essence of real wisdom and practical sense in that custom of the United States Supreme Court in ordering
oral arguments in practically all cases that come before it.
There seems to be no deviation from this rule of oral argument in all
the long history of that greatest of all our courts and state appellate courts
may well take a lesson from this wise custom. It is pleasant to note that our
own state supreme court is hearing a progressively larger number of oral
arguments in recent years.
I undertake to say that there is no satisfactory substitute for an oral
argument before an appellate court. The printed brief never can give to a
court that clear, full, consideration of the facts and issues'of a case that oral
arguments make possible. The oral argument clears the air; eliminates dubious theories, extraneous facts and matters and enables the judges to acquire
the very beft and clearest grasp of what the exact matter in dispute may be.
A printed brief may or may not effect this result.

